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NOTES
 
IMMIGRATION AND LABOR LAW—WE  NEED  YOUR  HELP! 
BUT  IT’S  GONNA  COST  YOU: ARRIAGA, CASTELLANOS-CON­
TRERAS, AND WHY POINT OF HIRE FEES SHOULD BE PAID BY THE 
EMPLOYER 
“America lives in the heart of every man everywhere who 
wishes to find a region somewhere where he will be free to work 
out his destiny as he chooses.” Woodrow Wilson1 
INTRODUCTION 
Each year, in an effort to alleviate labor shortages, the State 
Department permits2 over one hundred thousand3 low-skilled for­
eign workers to legally enter the United States for purposes of tem­
porary employment.4  Workers come from poorer nations around 
the globe, enticed by the promise of high paying jobs and the 
chance to make an honest and comfortable living for themselves 
1. Special to the New York Times, Crowds Hear Wilson and Clark Men, Too: 
Governor Leads Own Forces in Chicago Rally While Clark’s Lieutenants Plead for Him, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 1912), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res= 
9B0CE1D7133AE633A25754C0A9629C946396D6CF.  This quote is taken from a 
speech delivered in South Chicago while on the campaign trail. Id. Woodrow Wilson 
was the 28th President of the United States. Woodrow Wilson, THE  WHITE  HOUSE 
(Feb. 10, 2011, 4:00 PM) http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/woodrowwilson. 
2. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(h)(ii)(a)-(b) (2006). 
3. According to the State Department the United States admitted nearly 121,000 
foreign workers in 2005: “approximately 32,000 in agricultural work, and another 89,000 
. . . in other non-agricultural work.” MARY  BAUER, SOUTHERN  POVERTY  LAW  CTR., 
CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2007), avail­
able at www.vec.virginia.gov/vecportal/employer/pdf/splcguestworker.pdf; see also 
DEP’T OF STATE, FY-2005 NONIMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED 21 http://travel.state.gov/pdf/ 
FY2005_NIV_Detail_Table.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter NonImmigrant 
Visas Issued] (stating that there were a total of 31,892 H-2A visas and 87,492 H-2B visas 
issued in 2005). 
4. Congress does not set a limit on the number of agricultural workers that may 
be admitted each year but, by comparison, there is an annual cap of 66,000 non-agricul­
tural workers. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(B); id. § 1101. 
817 
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and their families.5  Francisco Sotelo-Aparicio6 was one such 
worker.  He was hired, along with ninety-nine others similarly situ­
ated, to work for a chain of eight “luxury boutique hotels,” in New 
Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.7  But before he could 
begin, like the majority of workers employed through the United 
States guest worker program, Francisco Sotelo-Aparicio was forced 
to take on crushing debt in the form of various point-of-hire fees.8 
Unfortunately, these fees, which almost always come out of the 
worker’s pocket, are rarely recoverable and create a system of in­
voluntary servitude.9  This happens for several reasons, one being 
that under current United States law foreign workers often pay, at 
least initially, all inbound transportation and visa costs.10  The other 
major cause of this debt is the fact that employers often look to 
recruitment agencies to secure workers.11  Unscrupulous recruiters 
promise prospective workers “high wages, overtime pay[,] and 
green cards.”12  Believing they will make a lot of money, the work­
ers are even more vulnerable to the recruiter’s demands for “an 
additional recruitment fee.”13  These fees have been reported to 
5. Bryce W. Ashby, Note, Indentured Guests—How the H-2A and H-2B Tempo­
rary Guest Worker Programs Create the Conditions for Indentured Servitude and Why 
Upfront Reimbursement for Guest Workers’ Transportation, Visa, and Recruitment 
Costs is the Solution, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 893, 905 (2008); see NonImmigrant Visas 
Issued, supra note 3, at 15-21 (separating H-2A and H-2B workers based on country or R 
origin).  Historically most of these workers came from Mexico and Central and South 
America, though, in recent years the United States has begun importing labor from 
places such as Thailand, South Africa, and Jamaica. See id. 
6. BAUER, supra note 3, at 12.  Sotelo Aparicio responded to a newspaper adver- R 
tisement seeking, among other things, maintenance workers. Id. 
7. Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 622 F.3d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 
2010) (en banc); see also BAUER, supra note 3, at 12; Workers Pay Up to $5,000 for R 
Post-Katrina Hotel Jobs, S. POVERTY LAW CTR. (Apr. 2007), http://www.splcenter.org/ 
publications/close-to-slavery-guestworker-programs-in-the-united-states/recruitment­
exploitation-be-1 [hereinafter Workers Pay Up to $5,000]. 
8. BAUER, supra note 3, at 12; Workers Pay Up to $5,000, supra note 7. For R 
purposes of this Note point-of-hire fees refers to inbound transportation, visa, and re­
cruitment expenses. 
9. See  BAUER, supra note 3, at 3-4. R 
10. See, e.g., Castellanos-Contreras, 622 F.3d at 396; Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, 
LLC, 305 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2002); Rivera v. Brickman Grp. Ltd., No. 05-1518, 
2008 WL 81570, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2008); Recinos-Recinos v. Express Forestry, Inc., 
No. 05-1355, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2510, at *44-45 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 2006); BAUER, 
supra note 3, at 19. R 
11. Ashby, supra note 5, at 905; BAUER, supra note 3, at 3-4. R 
12. Ashby, supra note 5, at 905. 
13. Id. 
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range anywhere from $3,000 to more than $20,000.14  Sometimes 
the recruiters charge these fees without the direct knowledge of the 
employer,15 making it all the more difficult for the worker to re­
cover the costs.  And because the workers do not have the money 
to begin with, they are forced to borrow at what are often times 
exorbitant interest rates.16  As one example, Alvaro Hernandez-Lo­
pez, a Guatemalan tree planter, was forced to sign a piece of paper 
handing over the deed to his house under the threat that failure to 
do so would result in being denied work in the United States.17 
Since World War II, foreign workers have been a driving force 
behind the United States economy.18  The United States, through a 
number of agreements19 and passage of the Immigration and Na­
tionality Act,20 has created a massive government program aimed at 
protecting the economy by alleviating the ill effects of labor 
shortages.21  In doing so, Congress has gone to great lengths to en­
sure that United States business interests, as well as interests of the 
domestic workforce, are protected.22  With these important inter­
ests in mind, it is of no surprise that little thought has ever been 
given to the actual laborers. 
Part I of this Note provides background on the United States 
guest worker program, particularly its historical purpose and the 
changes that have occurred over time.  One major theme through­
out this Note is the administratively created distinction between ag­
ricultural and non-agricultural workers and the problems that result 
14. See Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 576 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 
2009) (finding that workers paid between approximately $3,000 and approximately 
$5,000 in various point-of-hire fees), aff’d en banc, 622 F.3d 393; SPLC Lawsuit: Indian 
Guestworker Defrauded by Recruiters, Forced into Slave-like Conditions, S. POVERTY 
LAW CTR. (Mar. 10, 2008), http://www.splcenter.org/news/item.jsp?aid=302 [hereinafter 
SPLC Lawsuit] (alleging that over 100 Indian workers were defrauded out of as much 
as $20,000). 
15. SPLC Lawsuit, supra note 14. R 
16. BAUER, supra note 3, at 9. R 
17. Id. 
18. See generally id. at 3-5 (discussing the transformation of the Bracero program 
from its inception during World War II). 
19. DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CON­
TROL IN AMERICA 173 (2002). 
20. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006)). 
21. Id.  Congress’s power to authorize the legal admission of both agricultural 
and non-agricultural workers into the United States is codified in Title 8 of the United 
States Code. See id. §§ 1101(a)(15)(h)(ii)(a)-(b). 
22. See generally id. § 1101; Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens 
in the United States; Modernizing the Labor Certification Process and Enforcement, 73 
Fed. Reg. 77, 110 (Dec. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 655-56). 
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therefrom.  Part II examines two sharply contrasting circuit court 
cases: the first, an Eleventh Circuit opinion holding that point-of­
hire fees, in the context of agricultural workers,23 are primarily for 
the benefit of the employer and thus reimbursable; the second, a 
recent Fifth Circuit decision holding that none of these fees are re­
imbursable for non-agricultural workers.24  Part III analyzes current 
United States law and its application in the wake of these two diver­
gent opinions.25  This Part explains that an employee’s inbound 
transportation, visa, and recruitment fees are primarily for the ben­
efit of the employer.  These fees operate to drive an employee’s 
wages below the minimum wage requirement established by the 
Fair Labor Standards Act.  Finally, Part IV addresses the future of 
the guest worker program and discusses policy alternatives aimed at 
preventing foreign workers from falling prey to unscrupulous 
recruiters and exorbitant debt. 
I. THE FOREIGN GUEST WORKER PROGRAM 
Beginning in 1942, the United States began importing labor to 
supplement the nation’s depleted workforce through a series of 
agreements with Mexico.26  With passage of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act27 (INA) in 1952, Congress authorized the legal im­
portation of temporary low-skilled laborers conditioned on there 
being a lack of available domestic workers.28  From its inception, 
the purpose of creating a temporary foreign workforce was two­
fold: to ensure that United States businesses always had a steady 
and consistent labor force, while at the same time protecting do­
mestic workers from adverse effects attributed to the presence of 
undocumented workers.29 
Initially, all low-skilled workers were classified as one group of 
“H-2” workers.30  Despite the existence of one unified program, the 
23. See infra notes 82-117 and accompanying text. R 
24. See infra notes 118-133 and accompanying text. R 
25. Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 622 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc); Arriaga v. Florida Pacific Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002). 
26. BAUER, supra note 3, at 3-4. R 
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1101. 
28. Id.. § 1101(a)(15)(h)(ii)(a)-(b). 
29. Id.  § 1188(a)(1)(A)-(B). 
30. BAUER, supra note 3, at 5.  Congress drew no distinction between agricultural R 
work and non-agricultural work, instead creating one all encompassing classification for 
all low-skilled workers. Id. Agriculture employment is defined by the Migrant and 
Seasonal Agricultural Worker’s Protection Act to include “any service or activity in­
cluded within the provisions of section 3(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act [“FLSA”] 
. . . [along with] the handling, planting, drying, packing, packaging, processing, freezing, 
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Department of Labor (DOL) recognized abuses in agricultural 
work and issued separate rules for agricultural and non-agricultural 
workers.31  Congress sought to address this administratively created 
difference through passage of the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act (IRCA),32 which amended the INA and legislatively separated 
agricultural workers from non-agricultural workers, creating two 
distinct programs.33  From that point on, agricultural workers have 
been legally admitted into the United States on H-2A visas while 
non-agricultural workers have lawfully entered on H-2B visas.34 
Through IRCA, Congress provided specific guidelines for employ­
ing foreign agricultural workers and implemented employee protec­
tions into the H-2A program.35  It noted “the unique needs of 
growers and the inadequacy of current protections for farm work­
ers.”36  However, Congress specifically noted that no changes were 
made to the statutory language regarding non-agricultural H-2B 
workers, and that the guidelines and protections made available to 
or grading prior to delivery for storage of any agricultural or horticultural commodity in 
its unmanufactured state.”  29 U.S.C. § 1802 (2006); see also id. § 203(f).  The FLSA 
defines agriculture as: 
farming in all its branches and among other things includes the cultivation and
 
tillage of the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing, and harvest­
ing of any agricultural or horticultural commodities (including commodities
 
defined as agricultural commodities in section 1141j(g) of title 12), the raising
 
of livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals, or poultry, and any practices (including
 
any forestry or lumbering operations) performed by a farmer or on a farm as
 
an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations, including prepa­
ration for market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transpor­
tation to market.
 
Id.  Proposed rulemaking changes would expand the definition to include all forestry 
workers. See Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United 
States, 74 Fed. Reg. 45,906, 45,907 (proposed Sept. 4, 2009) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. 
pt. 655) [hereinafter Proposed Rule]. 
31. Martinez v. Reich, 934 F. Supp. 232, 237-38 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
32. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 
3359 (1986). 
33. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a)-(b); Martinez, 934 F. Supp. at 237 
(“Prior to the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Congress 
did not differentiate between temporary workers performing agricultural and non-agri­
cultural services.”); H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(II), at 28 (1986) (discussing authorizations 
“under a new H-2A worker program, targeted at agriculture”); BAUER, supra note 3, at R 
5 (“The H-2 program was revised in 1986 as part of the Immigration Reform and Con­
trol Act, which divided it into the H-2A agricultural program and the H-2B non-agricul­
tural program.”). 
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1188(c)(3)(B)(ii)(I); § 1188 (d)(1)-(3). 
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)-(d).  For discussion of employer protections, see 8 
§§ U.S.C. 1188(b)(3)-(4), 1188(c)(4), 1188(g)(2). 
36. Martinez, 934 F. Supp. at 237-38. 
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H-2A workers did not apply to the H-2B program.37  A federal dis­
trict court agreed with this interpretation, and in 1996,38 found that 
the DOL had not provided any additional regulation for the H-2B 
program.39 
In December 2008, with a view towards completely overhaul­
ing the H-2A program, the DOL announced a new set of rules for 
the guest worker program.40  President George W. Bush signed this 
new rule (the Final 2008 rule) into law on January 17, 2009.41 
Within months, the Obama administration’s new Secretary of La­
bor, Hilda Solis, announced the DOL’s intention to suspend the 
new rule and return to the preceding rule for a period of nine 
months.42  Once the nine-month period expired, the DOL would 
then offer a new proposal.43  However, before the DOL suspension 
could take place a federal district court in North Carolina granted 
an association of agricultural growers a preliminary injunction pre­
cluding the DOL from moving forward with the suspension.44  In its 
decision, the district court found that the DOL had violated the 
Administrative Procedures Act by failing to publish a notice of pro­
posed rulemaking changes and not allowing the public an adequate 
period of time to comment.45  The court, without much explanation, 
further held that the grower would suffer irreparable harm if the 
suspension were allowed.46  On September 4, 2009, the DOL issued 
a new notice of proposed rulemaking changes published in the Fed­
eral Register.47  The public had until October 20, 2009 to com­
37. Id. at 237. 
38. Id. at 237-28. 
39. Id. 
40. Proposed Rule, supra note 30, at 45,907. R 
41. Id. President Bush left office on January 20, 2009. See David Jackson, Upbeat 
Bush Leaves Office Quietly, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/ 
news/nation/2009-01-20-bush_N.htm. 
42. Proposed Rule, supra note 30, at 45,908. R 
43. Id. at 45,907. 
44. N.C. Growers’ Ass’n v. Solis, 644 F. Supp. 2d 664, 674 (M.D. N.C. 2009). 
45. Id. at 672-73.  The court held that suspending the new rule and returning to 
the old rule, in effect, constitutes a rule change and must, for purposes of the Adminis­
trative Procedures Act, be published. Id. at 672 n.8; see Administrative Procedures 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5563 (2006). 
46. N.C. Growers’ Ass’n, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 669-71. 
47. Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States, 70 
Fed. Reg. 171 (proposed Sept. 4, 2009) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655 and 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 501). 
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ment.48  On February 12, 2010, the DOL announced its final rule 
regarding H-2A workers.49 
A. The Bracero Program 
As the United States prepared for World War II, the State De­
partment, aware of an impending labor shortage, entered into the 
Bracero agreement with Mexico to import foreign workers.50  Crit­
ics, fearful of a spike in immigrant population, were silenced by 
program proponents’ assertions that these Mexican workers could 
easily be returned.51  United States employers were required to 
comply with a number of measures designed to protect the interests 
of the Mexican workers.52  Despite the inclusion of these protective 
measures, the program was fraught with abuse.53  With little gov­
ernment oversight, workers had money withheld by employers and 
were often forced to labor under deplorable conditions.54  In addi­
tion to the problems suffered by the temporary workers, U.S. do­
mestic laborers were “undermined [in their] ability . . . to demand 
higher wages”55 because the Bracero program “create[d] the oppor­
tunity for [United States] employers to exploit cheap labor.”56  In 
this climate, domestic workers were simply unable to compete with 
48. News & Updates, OFFICE OF FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION, U.S. DEP’T OF  
LABOR, http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/news.cfm (last updated Oct. 29, 2010); 
Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States; Extension 
of Comment Period, 74 Fed. Reg. 50,930 (Oct. 2, 2009). 
49. Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States, 75 
Fed. Reg. 6884, 6925 (Feb. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655 and 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 501).  Among the major changes, this final rule moves away from the Bush adminis­
tration’s “attestation” based program, which allowed employers to attest to the fact that 
they had made reasonable efforts to secure domestic workers and had complied with all 
applicable law, and back to the more rigid labor certification program. See id. 
50. TICHENOR, supra note 19, at 173. R 
51. Id. 
52. BAUER, supra note 3, at 4.  The agreement between Mexico and the United R 
States required U.S. employers to: enter into individual contracts with employees 
“under government supervision,” provide acceptable housing, pay the higher of a mini­
mum wage or prevailing wage, if sufficient wages were not paid the U.S. government 
would supplement, and offer at least thirty days of work.  Additionally, the agreement 
specified that the cost of transportation was to be shared by the worker, employer, and 
the U.S. government. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. See id. 
55. Id. at 5. 
56. Shannon Leigh Vivian, Note, Be Our Guest: A Review of the Legal and Regu­
latory History of U.S. Immigration Policy Toward Mexico and Recommendations for 
Combating Employer Exploitation of Nonimmigrant and Undocumented Workers, 30 
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 189, 198 (2005). 
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the Mexican workers, who could be hired and exploited for consid­
erably less money.57 
The United States H-2 visa program was officially born in 1942, 
when the government allowed the Florida sugar cane industry to 
import workers from the Caribbean to pick sugar cane on a tempo­
rary basis.58  This signaled the beginning of the end for the Bracero 
program, which officially ceased in 1964 as all temporary foreign 
labor was merged into one now-expansive H-2 guest worker 
program.59 
B. The Immigration and Nationality Act 
The 1952 INA serves as the principle legislative mechanism for 
regulation and oversight of the modern guest worker programs.60 
Under the INA, it is the Secretary of Homeland Security’s responsi­
bility to grant or deny all petitions for temporary non-immigrant 
labor, though, before a petitioner applies with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, he must first receive certification from the Sec­
retary of Labor.61  For the Secretary of Labor to grant certification, 
a petitioner must demonstrate that two important factors have been 
met.62  First, a petitioner must demonstrative that there are an in­
sufficient number of United States workers possessing the skills, 
ability, and availability necessary to perform the job involved in the 
petition.63  Second, a petitioner must demonstrate that employing a 
foreign worker in a particular job “will not adversely affect the 
wages and working conditions” of similarly employed workers in 
the United States.64 
The government grants two distinct types of visas to low-
skilled, nonimmigrant workers: agricultural workers, pursuant to 
the INA, are issued H-2A visas, while non-agricultural workers are 
legally admitted on H-2B visas.65  These visas have the intended 
purpose of alleviating temporary work shortages; for purposes of 
57. Id.; see also Lorenzo Alvarado, Comment, A Lesson from My Grandfather, 
the Bracero, 22 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 55, 58-59, 64-65 (2001). 
58. ALEC  WILKINSON, BIG  SUGAR: SEASONS IN THE  CANE  FIELDS OF  FLORIDA 
25-30 (1989). 
59. BAUER, supra note 3, at 5. R 
60. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006)). 
61. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(H). 
62. Id. § 1188(a)(1)(A)-(B). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a)-(b); id. § 1101(a)(h)(ii)(b). 
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the H-2A program, “temporary [employment,] except in extraordi­
nary circumstances, [will] last no longer than one year.”66  Under 
the final rule, employers must contractually forbid recruiters and 
their agents67 from receiving or seeking payments from prospective 
employees as a condition of employment.68  These prohibited pay­
ments include any fee collected for an activity related to obtaining 
the labor certificate.69  The cost of obtaining a passport remains 
with the worker, however, employers are required by the final rule 
to pay any “visa” fees since these fees primarily benefit the em­
ployer by allowing employees to legally enter for work.70  If an em­
ployer violates any provision of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
they subject themselves to possible program debarment.71  These 
debarments, if enforced, only last for three years, as evidenced by 
the case of Global Horizons.72  That company was responsible for 
subjecting 170 workers from Thailand into forced labor and was 
debarred from the H-2 program in July 2006.73  Their debarment 
was lifted in June of 2009.74 
C. The Fair Labor Standards Act 
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) as a 
means of protecting those workers who lack the bargaining power 
necessary to attain wages adequate for daily life.75  In pursuit of 
66. 20 C.F.R. §  655.103(d) (2010). 
67. This could be an important departure from previous rules that made no men­
tion of “agents.”  Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United 
States, 75 Fed. Reg. 6884, 6925 (Feb. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655). This 
rule change seeks to “clarif[y] that the contractual prohibition must extend to any agent 
of the foreign labor contractor or recruiter.” Id. 
68. 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(k). 
69. Id. § 655.22(j). 
70. Id. § 655.22(g)(2).  The final rule makes clear that the only cost belonging to 
the employee is the cost of obtaining their passport; visa costs, which permit the worker 
to legally enter for work, primarily benefit the employer. See Temporary Agricultural 
Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6924. 
71. 20 C.F.R. § 655.31. 
72. Kari Lyderson, Guest Workers Seek Global Horizons: U.S. Company Profits 
from Migrant Labor, CORPWATCH (Nov. 3, 2006), http://www.corpwatch.org/article. 
php?id=14216. 
73. Id.; Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration Office of 
Foreign Labor Certifications Program Debarments, DEP’T OF LABOR, available at http:// 
www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc=1016—6732—8737—27863—26205 (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2011). 
74. OFFICE OF FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION, DEP’T OF LABOR PROGRAM DE­
BARMENTS, http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/Debartment_List_Revisions.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2011). 
75. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706-07 (1945). 
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that objective, the FLSA requires employers to pay wages “free and 
clear” of deductions,76 subject to a narrow exception whereby the 
reasonable costs of providing “board, lodging, or other facilities” 
may be treated as wages for FLSA purposes.77  The FLSA creates a 
federal minimum wage requirement,78 which establishes the mini­
mum earnings an employee must receive based on an hourly rate 
per workweek.79  If, during a particular work week, an amount is 
owed to an employee and is found “withheld in violation of [the 
FLSA],” that amount owed will be deemed an unpaid minimum 
wage.80  A failure on the part of the employer to comply with the 
minimum wage requirement results not only in the employer being 
liable for any unpaid wages, but also for liquidated damages in an 
amount equal to the unpaid wages.81 
II. THE ELEVENTH AND FIFTH CIRCUITS WEIGH IN
 
ON THE QUESTION OF FEES
 
A. Arriaga and the Eleventh Circuit 
In Arriaga v. Florida Pacific Farms, the Eleventh Circuit held 
that if an expense primarily benefits the employer that expense 
must be reimbursed to the employee to the extent that the cost 
drove the employee’s wages below the federal minimum wage re­
quirement in order to satisfy the FLSA; the expense must be reim­
bursed within the week in which it occurred.82  This approach, 
adopted by a number of lower courts,83 was the general interpreta­
tion of the FLSA for both H-2A and H-2B84 workers until a recent 
decision by the Fifth Circuit changed all of that.85 
Arriaga involved a group of Mexican farm workers lawfully ad­
mitted to the United States under the H-2A program to pick 
76. 29 C.F.R. §§ 531.35, 776.4 (2010). 
77. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (2006). 
78. Id. § 206. 
79. Id. § 206(a)(1).  As of May 2009 this rate is set at $7.25 per hour. Id. 
80. Id. § 206(d)(3). 
81. Id. § 216(b). 
82. Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d 1228, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2002). 
83. See Recinos-Recinos v. Express Forestry, Inc., No. 05-1355, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2510, at *44-45 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 2006); see also Rivera v. Brickman Grp. Ltd., 
No. 05-1518, 2008 WL 81570 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2008). 
84. See Recinos-Recinos., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2510, at *44-45. 
85. See Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 622 F.3d 393, 393 (5th Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (holding that employers are under no legal obligation to reimburse an 
H-2B worker for their inbound transportation, visa, and recruitment expenses). 
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\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE304.txt unknown Seq: 11 29-SEP-11 10:16 
2011] WE NEED YOUR HELP! 
strawberries and raspberries during the 1998-99 season.86  Florida 
Pacific Farms (the Growers), in order to meet labor demands con­
tracted with the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association (FFVA) 
for purposes of recruiting and hiring foreign workers.87  All applica­
tions for foreign workers were completed by the FFVA, who “of­
fered transportation arrangements in compliance with the 
requirements of [DOL].”88  Prospective employees were told they 
would need $130 for transportation from Monterrey to Florida, $45 
for the visa application, and another $100 for the visa itself.89  In 
addition, the workers were charged varying “referral fees”90 by lo­
cal contact people, hired by the “travel” company to refer suitable 
workers.91  Some were forced to pay an additional recruitment fee 
to the travel company’s own employees without anyone else’s direct 
knowledge.92  The Growers, who were already paying the travel 
company $50 per worker, “had directed [it] not to charge the work­
ers a fee.”93 
Once 50 percent of the contract period had expired, the Grow­
ers reimbursed the workers $130 for transportation from Monterrey 
to Florida.94  When the entire contract period expired, each worker 
was given $20 for a bus ticket back to Mexico.95  They were never 
paid for transportation from their homes to Monterrey, visa costs, 
or the entry document fee; nor were they ever reimbursed for “re­
ferral” payments made to the travel company or its employees.96 
Seeking legal relief, the farm workers filed suit claiming that 
the Growers violated the FLSA by not reimbursing them for travel, 
visa, and recruitment expenses at the end of their first week of 
work.97  This failure to tender reimbursement resulted in the work­
86. Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1231. 
87. Id. at 1233-34. 
88. Id. at 1233; 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(5)(i) (2006) (stating “that any worker who 
completed the first fifty percent of the contract period would be reimbursed for the cost 
of his transportation to the jobsite ‘from the place from which the worker has come to 
work for the employer’”). 
89. Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1234. 
90. Id. 
91. Id.  The “travel” company was Florida East Coast Travel and their agent was 
Berthina Cervantes. Id. at 1233.  Cervantes maintained an office in Monterrey, Mexico 
and was primarily responsible for locating the workers. Id. at 1233-34. 
92. Id. at 1234. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 1231-32. 
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ers’ wages falling below the minimum wage requirement set by the 
FLSA.98  Holding that inbound transportation and visa expenses 
are an “incident of and necessary to” employment, the Eleventh 
Circuit said that a worker’s travel and visa expenses are always the 
responsibility of the employer.99  While the court did not ultimately 
hold the Growers responsible for the “referral fees,” it did leave 
open the possibility that recruitment fees may also be reimbursable 
under the FLSA.100  The court began its analysis by noting that 
“[t]he protections of the minimum wage provision of the [FLSA] 
indisputably apply to . . . [f]arm workers.”101  “Employers [are re­
quired to] provide workers’ weekly wages ‘in cash or in facilities,’ 
‘free and clear’ of [any] improper deductions, at a rate no lower 
than the minimum wage rate. . . .”102  The only statutory exception 
to this FLSA requirement is 29 U.S.C. § 203(m), which says that an 
employer can count the reasonable cost of furnishing an employee 
with “board, lodging, or other facilities” as wages.103 
The Growers argued that any FLSA analysis had to at least be 
guided by the H-2A regulations, which require workers who com­
plete 50 percent of the contract period to be compensated for in­
bound transportation costs if those payments have not previously 
been provided.104  Reiterating that the regulations required em­
ployers to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local law,105 
the court rejected this argument.106  The court stated that whenever 
employment statutes overlap, the higher requirement must always 
be applied unless the regulations are “mutually exclusive.”107 
The Growers argued, unsuccessfully, that forcing an employer 
to reimburse these expenses in the first week may provide employ­
ees with an incentive to leave after only one week.108  Acknowledg­
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 1237 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 531.32(a) & (c) (2010)). 
100. Id. at 1244-46 (stating that had the workers been able to show that the 
recruiters acted with apparent authority, the Growers would be liable for the recruit­
ment fees as well). 
101. Id. at 1235. 
102. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. §§ 531.35 & 776.4). 
103. Id. at 1235. 
104. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(h) (2010) (most current version). 
105. Id. at 1235.  The court, citing the Code of Federal Regulations, noted that 
“[d]uring the period for which the temporary alien agricultural labor certification is 
granted, the employer shall comply with applicable federal, State, and local employ­
ment-related laws and regulations.” Id.; see 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(b). 
106. Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1235. 
107. Id. (quoting Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 519 (1950)). 
108. Id. at 1236. 
 
 
829 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE304.txt unknown Seq: 13 29-SEP-11 10:16 
2011] WE NEED YOUR HELP! 
ing that this was more of a policy issue than a legal one, the court 
maintained that in the absence of clear legislative intent employers 
were required to abide by the FLSA.109 
The court’s ultimate holding in Arriaga was that under the 
FLSA, “[if] an expense is determined to be primarily for the benefit 
of the employer, the employer must reimburse the employee during 
the workweek in which the expense arose.”110  Finding that trans­
portation costs were “incident of and necessary to” employment, 
the court held that these expenses were reimbursable.111  The court 
similarly found that visa costs are “necessitated by the Growers’ 
employment of the [f]armworkers under the H-2A program” and 
are not the type of costs “that would arise as an ordinary living 
expense.”112  Once an employer chooses to utilize the program, 
these costs are certain to arise and it becomes incumbent upon the 
employer to pay them.113 
Lastly, the court held that if “apparent authority” is created in 
a third person by the employer, then the employer might be respon­
sible for reimbursement of recruitment fees.114  Two elements must 
be satisfied in order to require reimbursement of recruitment fees: 
first, the fees cannot “constitute ‘other facilities,’” and second, 
“there must be authority to hold the [employer] liable for the unau­
thorized acts of [his or her] agents.”115  In order to determine 
whether “apparent authority” has been created in a third party, the 
court looked to the Restatement (Second) of Agency section 159, 
which says that 
apparent authority is “created as to a third person by written or 
spoken words or any other conduct of the principal which, rea­
sonably interpreted, causes the third person to believe that the 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 1237; 29 C.F.R. § 531.35 (2010). 
111. Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 123-38 (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 531.3 & 531.32 (2010)). The 
court also cited the Department of Labor opinion letter that characterized the costs as 
“incidental to the employer’s recruitment program.” Id. at 1238; see U.S. DEP’T OF  
LABOR, OP. LTR. OF THE WAGE-HOUR ADM’R No. 1139 (WH-92) (Dec. 10, 1970). 
112. Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1244.  In support of this finding, the court analyzed 
whether or not something was an ordinary living expense. Id. at 1242-44. While meals 
are cited as being primarily for the benefit of the employee, other things, such as min­
ers’ lamps, safety caps, and explosives are always primarily for the employer’s benefit. 
Id. at 1243. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 1244-46 (failing to allege sufficient facts to support this, the court held 
that the Growers in Arriaga were not responsible for reimbursement of the recruitment 
fees). 
115. Id. at 1245. 
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principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by the per­
son purporting to act for him.”116 
Since the workers could not establish that the Growers had created 
this apparent authority in the travel company, recruitment fees 
were held to not be reimbursable in this instance.117 
B. Castellanos-Contreras and the Fifth Circuit 
In the years following Arriaga, federal district courts applied 
its principles to H-2B workers as well.118  That changed when the 
Fifth Circuit, in Castellanos-Contreras,119 held that, even though 
non-agricultural H-2B workers were entitled to FLSA protection, 
they were not entitled to reimbursement for transportation, visa, 
and recruitment fees.120 
In 2006, Decatur Hotels owned and operated fifteen five-star 
hotels in the New Orleans area.121  Following Hurricane Katrina, 
Decatur looked to Accent Personnel Services Inc. (Accent) to help 
them fill 270 vacant hotel jobs.122  For their efforts in securing these 
workers, Accent earned $1,200 per employee.123  Workers were pri­
marily recruited from Peru, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic 
and were forced to pay between $3,000 and $5,000 in various re­
cruitment, travel, and visa expenses in order to work for Decatur.124 
While they were promised forty hours of work each week with 
116. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (2008)). 
117. Id. at 1245-46. 
118. See Recinos-Recinos v. Express Forestry, Inc., No. 05-1355, 2006 U.S. Distr. 
LEXIS 2510, at *44-45 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 2006); see also Rivera v. Brickman Grp. Ltd., 
No. 05-1518, 2008 WL 81570 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2008) (holding that inbound transporta­
tion costs, visa costs, and recruitment fees were primarily for the benefit of the em­
ployer and were thus reimbursable in the H-2B context); Ashby, supra note 5, at 905. 
In a case before the Eastern District Court of Louisiana the court held that “[t]he ratio­
nale employed by the Arriaga court is applicable to the H-2B program.” Recinos-Reci­
nos, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2510, at *44-45. 
119. In an opinion authored in February of 2009 the Fifth Circuit held that the 
Eleventh Circuit got it wrong in Arriaga and pre-employment expenses were never re­
imbursable; backing away from this, somewhat, the court withdrew that opinion and 
issued a new opinion distinguishing Arriaga as applying to H-2A workers only. See 
Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 576 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d en 
banc, 622 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2010) (affirming panel decision). 
120. Castellanos-Contreras, 622 F.3d at 403. 
121. Castellanos-Contreras, 576 F.3d at 276; see also BAUER, supra note 3, at 10. R 
122. Castellanos-Contreras, 576 F.3d at 277; see also BAUER, supra note 3, at 4-5. R 
123. Castellanos-Contreras, 576 F.3d at 277.  Accent earned $300 per employee 
from Decatur and another $900 per employee from the various foreign recruiters and 
subcontractors. Id.; see also BAUER, supra note 3, at 4-5. R 
124. Castellanos-Contreras, 576 F.3d at 277-78; see also BAUER, supra note 3, at 4- R 
5. 
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plenty of overtime, the workers instead found themselves typically 
working twenty-five hours or less per week.125 
As a starting point, the Fifth Circuit opined that an employee’s 
wages could not be “free and clear,” as required, if they “kick[ed]­
back” either directly or indirectly to the employer.126  The court ex­
plained that a “kick-back” occurs when the employer shifts any bus­
iness expense to the employee.127  But rather than analyzing 
whether these payments were business expenses, the court instead 
initially found the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation in Arriaga alto­
gether incorrect.128  In a superseding opinion, the Fifth Circuit held 
that Arriaga was limited to H-2A workers and H-2B workers were 
not entitled to any reimbursement for out-of-pocket travel, visa, 
and recruitment expenses.129  The court, in reaching this decision, 
cited to inferences that could be drawn from the regulations.130 
According to the court, since the Code of Federal Regulations 
allows for visa transferability from one employer to another, the 
workers’ assertions that visa “expenses are specific and unique to 
the employer” are contradicted.131  The court applied this logic to 
transportation expenses as well, finding that since sometimes an H­
2B worker’s outbound transportation expenses belong to an em­
ployer, while an H-2A workers inbound transportation expenses 
belong to the employer, it must have been intended that H-2B in­
bound transportation expenses always be the responsibility of the 
employee.132  Finally, the court held that, like with visa expenses, 
there was a “division of payment for each party’s respective bene­
125. Castellanos-Contreras, 576 F.3d at 274; see also BAUER, supra note 3, at 4-5. R 
126. Castellanos-Contreras, 576 F.3d at 280. 
127. Id. 
128. Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 559 F.3d 332, 338 n.3 (5th 
Cir.), withdrawn and superseded by, 576 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d en banc, 622 
F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2010). 
129. Castellanos-Conteraras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 622 F.3d 393, 402-03 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (en banc).  The Fifth Circuit, upon rehearing en banc, vacated their 2009 
opinion and superseded it with this opinion. Id. at 396.  In finding transportation, visa, 
and recruitment expenses to be the responsibility of the workers, they chose to distin­
guish themselves from the Eleventh Circuit in Arriaga by noting that their case dealt 
with H-2B workers while Arriaga dealt with H-2A workers. Id. at 402-03. 
130. Id. at 402-03. 
131. Id. at 401 n.7 (noting that five years removed from Hurricane Katrina some 
of the temporary workers were still in the country). 
132. Id. at 400 (discussing regulations on inbound and outbound travel expenses 
and stating that the “[s]ilence on this issue is . . . deafening”). 
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fit,” which indicated that “the [w]orkers’ use of recruiters in their 
own countries was not [a] . . . business expense.”133 
III. FEDERAL LAW AND THE FEES 
A.	 The FLSA Applies to Both H-2A and H-2B Workers 
To start, there is no distinction between H-2A and H-2B work­
ers for purposes of applying the FLSA.134  That question has never 
been a point of controversy, evidenced in part by the fact that both 
the Arriaga and Castellanos-Contreras courts concluded, despite 
coming to divergent results, that the FLSA applies to agricultural as 
well as non-agricultural temporary foreign workers.135  This is so 
because under the guest worker program, all “employer[s] [are le­
gally bound to] comply with [all] applicable federal, [s]tate, and lo­
cal employment related laws and regulations.”136  Simply put, when 
invoking protection under the FLSA an employee’s status is irrele­
vant because the FLSA is “applicable to citizens and aliens 
alike. . . .”137  Since the FLSA applies to all guest workers, regard­
less of classification, the next logical question becomes whether fail­
ure to reimburse for pre-employment point-of-hire fees violates the 
statute. 
B.	 Because the Higher Standard is Required, the FLSA Must Be 
Applied 
Before discussing whether the fees are within reach of the stat­
ute it is important to note that the FLSA, not the regulations, is the 
controlling law when it comes to reimbursement of point of hire 
fees.  In splitting with the Eleventh Circuit, the Castellanos-Con­
133. Id. at 404.  This may be oversimplifying the matter; foreign recruiters seek 
out prospective employees at the employer’s behest and then, in some instances, charge 
exorbitant recruitment fees. See BAUER, supra note 3, at 3-5, 9. 
134. See Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 576 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 
2009), aff’d en banc, 622 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2010); Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 
F.3d 1228, 1237 (11th Cir. 2002). 
135.	 See Castellanos-Contreras, 576 F.3d at 280; Ariagga, 305 F.3d at 1237. 
136. Ariagga, 305 F.3d at 1235 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(b) (2010)). The Code 
contains a similar provision for H-2B workers.  20 C.F.R. § 655.22(d) (“During the pe­
riod of employment that is the subject of the labor certification application, the em­
ployer will comply with applicable Federal, State and local employment-related laws 
and regulations.”). 
137. In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (involving inquiry into applica­
bility of the Fair Labor Standards Act to undocumented workers). Somewhat ironi­
cally, the Fifth Circuit dealt with this question more than two decades ago. See id.  “An 
employee is [defined under the FLSA as being] ‘any individual employed by an em­
ployer.’” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2006)). 
833 
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treras court held that H-2B workers were not entitled to any reim­
bursement for pre-employment expenses because the regulations 
required that they pay for their visa and inbound transportation.138 
This was a similar argument to one advanced by the Growers in 
Arriaga.139  Under H-2A regulations, any worker who remains on 
the job for fifty percent of the contract period must be reimbursed 
for their inbound-travel expenses.140  However, whenever employ­
ment statutes overlap, the Supreme Court has held that the higher 
requirement is the proper standard.141  It may seem like splitting 
hairs, but in this instance it makes logical sense that, from the work­
ers perspective, a statute requiring employees to be reimbursed in 
their first week of work is a significantly higher standard than one 
which requires that they be reimbursed following completion of 
fifty percent of the contract period.  Taking it one step further, since 
the regulations require H-2B workers to pay their own visa and 
travel expenses without any indication that these fees are to be re­
imbursed, a statute that says wage deductions must be reimbursed 
clearly provides the higher standard. 
Employers could argue that application of the FLSA only op­
erates to circumvent the regulations; forcing employers to reim­
burse for transportation in the first week is bad policy because the 
employer surrenders this money without guarantee that the worker 
will remain in their employ.142  This argument is, however, not com­
pelling and is, as the court in Arriaga found, devoid of any legal 
merit.143  As mentioned above, the Supreme Court has clearly 
stated, “when employment statutes overlap, [courts] are to apply 
the higher requirement unless the regulations are mutually exclu­
sive.”144  Here, in the case of wage deductions, the FLSA provides 
138. Castellanos-Contreras, 622 F.3d at 400, 402-03 (noting a distinction in “regu­
latory regime[s]” for H-2A and H-2B workers).  The Court stated that recent changes in 
the DOL’s interpretation of its rules could not be applied “retroactively” since the re­
sult would be to impose “new and unanticipated obligations . . . [on Decatur] without 
notice or an opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 401 (quoting Bradley v. School Bd. of 
Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974)). 
139. Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1235 (“According to the Growers, the FLSA analysis 
should be guided by the H-2A regulations.”). 
140. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.104(h)(1) (“[I]f the worker completes 50 percent of the 
work contract period, the employer must pay the worker for reasonable costs incurred 
by the worker for transportation and daily subsistence from the place from which the 
worker has departed to the employer’s place of employment.”). 
141. See Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 519 (1950). 
142. Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1235, 1237. 
143. Id. at 1235. 
144. Id. 
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the higher requirement and these two differing standards are not 
mutually exclusive.145  The primary and fundamental purpose of the 
FLSA is to protect workers;146 and in order to do that, it requires, 
among other things, employees be reimbursed within the week that 
the deductions occurred.147  Though the distinction might be subtle, 
from the workers’ perspective, reimbursement in the first week of 
employment is the higher standard. 
By finding that H-2B workers are not entitled to reimburse­
ment for any of these fees, courts are subjecting a class already af­
forded less protection to further abuse. The question in this 
instance should not focus on whether the regulations require reim­
bursement, but instead on whether the expenses are themselves 
business expenses.  The argument coming out of Castellanos-Con­
treras seems to be that the H-2B regulations imply that these ex­
penses more properly belong to the employee.148  However, the 
FLSA says that if it is a business expense that is shifted from the 
employer to the employee, it violates the act.149  So then, if these 
fees are in fact business expenses, the FLSA applies and since the 
FLSA carries the higher requirement in this instance, it and not the 
regulations should be the controlling law. 
Since the FLSA applies to both H-2A and H-2B workers, and 
courts are required to apply the higher standard, the question of 
whether these payments are reimbursable turns on whether these 
fees150 constitute an impermissible deduction in wages,151 and if so, 
whether they violate the FLSA? 
145. See id. at 1235-36. 
146. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2006); see Powell, 339 U.S. at 509-10 (“In this Act, the pri­
mary purpose of Congress was not to regulate interstate commerce as such.  It was to 
eliminate, as rapidly as practicable, substandard labor conditions throughout the nation. 
It sought to raise living standards without substantially curtailing employment or earn­
ing power.”).  For further discussion and analysis see generally Bruce Goldstein, Marc 
Linder, Laurence E. Norton II, & Catherine Ruckelshaus, Enforcing Fair Labor Stan­
dards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Em­
ployment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1087-88 (1999). 
147. Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1235, 1237. 
148. Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 622 F.3d 393, 400 OR 403 
(5th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
149. 29 C.F.R. § 531.35 (2010); Castellanos-Contreras, 622 F.3d at 400-01 (finding 
that “[Fifth Circuit] precedents look to the nature of the disputed expenses,” and citing 
Mayhue’s Super Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Hodgson, 464 F.2d 1196, 1199 (5th Cir. 1972), 
which “ask[ed] whether an act tended to shift employer expenses”). 
150. For purposes of this Note point-of-hire expenses are defined as: travel, visa, 
and recruitment expenses. 
151. These types of deductions are considered “de facto” wage deductions. See 
Ariagga, 305 F.3d at 1237 (“The costs in dispute are de facto deductions which, if not 
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C.	 These Fees are Impermissible Wage Deductions 
Before analyzing whether the fees are in fact wage deductions, 
it is important to illustrate just how expenses characterized as being 
primarily for the benefit of the employer would violate the FLSA’s 
minimum wage requirement, something that can be done through a 
useful hypothetical created by the Arriaga court.  The hypothetical 
assumes the FLSA minimum wage rate to be $5.15 per hour.152 
Suppose a worker is required to [purchase his own] work tools, 
which cost $100.  In his first workweek, he works 40 hours at a 
rate of $7 per hour.  If only given pay for the hours worked, 
which would be $280, the FLSA would be violated. This is so 
because the cost of the tools, which has been imposed on the 
worker prior to employment, reduces the wages to $180; when 
$180 is divided by 40 hours, the hourly rate drops below the mini­
mum wage of $5.15.  However, the FLSA does not require the 
employer to add the cost of the tools onto the regular wages, but 
only to reimburse the worker up to the point that the minimum 
wage is met.  To satisfy the FLSA, the employer would need to 
pay this worker $306 the first workweek: $100 for the tools plus 
$206 (40 hours multiplied by $5.15).153 
1.	 The Fees Constitute a Business Expense that is
 
Improperly Shifted to the Employee
 
An employee’s wages154 must be received unencumbered.155 
In other words, any time an employer deducts a portion of the 
permissible, drove the Farmworkers’ pay below the FLSA minimum wage.”). “De 
facto” is defined as: “Actual; existing in fact; having effect even though not formally or 
legally recognized.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009). 
152. Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1237 n.11. 
153. Id. 
154. The Fair Labor Standards Act does not specifically define what a “wage” is, 
but does discuss what may or may not be included. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (2006) 
(stating that wages are not restricted to cash remuneration, but that “board, lodging, or 
other facilities” may, where appropriate, be included). The Department of Labor’s in­
terpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act states that wage payments must be in 
either cash or its equivalent. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.35 (2010).  There is a federal defini­
tion of wages found in Title 42 of the United States Code.  Here wages are defined to 
“includ[e] the cash value of all remuneration.” See 42 U.S.C. § 409(a) (2006). The 
DOL’s Bureau of Labor Statistics cites the Occupational Employment Statistics defini­
tion of wages: “straight-time, gross pay, exclusive of premium pay.” BLS Information: 
Frequently Asked Questions, BUREAU OF  LABOR  STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF  LABOR, 
http://www.bls.gov/dolfaq/bls_ques20.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2011)  (using the defini­
tion of wages employed by the Occupational Employment Statistics survey, which gath­
ered employment statistics for over 800 different occupations including various low-
skilled agricultural and non-agricultural jobs). 
155. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.35. 
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worker’s pay or the employee spends their own money for some­
thing that is in fact a business expense,156 that amount becomes 
money owed to the employee.  Whatever wages the employee re­
ceives are encumbered because they, by virtue of the debt, cannot 
walk away “free and clear” with all they were owed.157  In this in­
stance, “failure to pay . . . pre-employment expenses encumber[ ] 
. . . guest workers’ wages, so that [the employer does] not pay the 
wages ‘finally and unconditionally or free and clear.’”158  There­
fore, using the Fifth Circuit’s words, all wages must be “free and 
clear” and 
cannot be considered to have been paid by the employer and re­
ceived by the employee unless they are paid finally and uncondi­
tionally. . . .  [These] requirements . . . [are] not . . . met where the 
employee ‘kicks-back’ directly or indirectly to the employer or to 
another person for the employer’s benefit the whole or part of 
the wage delivered to the employee.159 
Addressing the issue of when an employee-incurred “kick­
back” occurs, the Castellanos-Contreras court found that, while not 
defined in the regulations, Fifth Circuit precedent recognizes a 
“kick-back” if the expense “tend[s] to shift part of the employer’s 
business expense to the employees.”160 
In a case involving an employer requiring his employees to 
make voluntary repayments of cash register shortages, the Fifth 
Circuit held that the employer was violating the FLSA because the 
requirement impermissibly shifted part of the employer’s business 
expense to the employee and drove the employee’s wages below 
the federal minimum wage requirement.161  The reason that this 
156. Any expense “primarily for the benefit and convenience of the employer” is 
not “reasonable and may not therefore be [used] in computing wages.” See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 531.3(d)(1).  For instance, if an employee is required to provide his own tools for 
work or is required to purchase a uniform, those expenses are primarily for the benefit 
and convenience of the employer and as such count as deductions in the employee’s 
wages that must be reimbursed for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See 29 
C.F.R. § 531.3(d)(2). 
157. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.35. 
158. Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 576 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 
2009) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d en banc, 622 F.3d 393 
(5th Cir. 2010). 
159. 29 C.F.R. § 531.35. 
160. See Castellanos-Contreras, 576 F.3d at 290 (alteration in original) (citing 
Mayhue’s Super Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Hodgson, 464 F.2d 1196, 1199 (5th Cir. 1972)). 
161. Mayhue’s, 464 F.2d at 1199; see also Brennan v. Veterans Cleaning Serv., 
Inc., 482 F.2d 1362, 1370 (5th Cir. 1973) (involving the deduction of employee wages to 
pay for a damaged company truck). 
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was impermissible was that, as the Fifth Circuit in Mayhue 
reasoned: 
with the employee’s financial picture burdened with the “valid 
debt” of the shortages, he is receiving less for his services than 
the wage that is paid to him. Whether he pays the “valid debt” 
out of his wages or other resources, his effective rate of pay is 
reduced by the amount of such debts.  When it is reduced below 
the required minimum wage, the law is violated.162 
Similarly, workers, such as those employed by Decatur Hotels, 
paid an expense properly belonging to their employer out of their 
wages, effectively reducing the amount of their pay below the mini­
mum wage requirement.163  Because of this shift, the wages cannot 
be characterized as “free and clear”; workers are encumbered by a 
debt that should have, for all intents and purposes, been paid by 
their employer.164  Put another way, because these costs belonged 
to the employer, and not the employee, their wages were not re­
ceived “finally and unconditionally” as required by the 
regulations.165 
By focusing on the question of whether the regulations allow 
an H-2B worker to recover these costs, the court, in Castellanos-
Contreras missed the opportunity to engage in a meaningful analy­
sis of whether pre-employment expenses constitute an impermissi­
ble shift of the employer’s business expense.  Had it taken the time 
to address this question, rather than just dismissing it, the court 
might have provided a useful analysis as to whether these expenses 
could be characterized as de facto wage deductions. This is signifi­
cant because if pre-employment expenses were characterized as de 
facto wage deductions then, for purposes of the FLSA, the pay­
ments would have to be reimbursed.166 
2. The “Other Facilities” Analogy 
Another way of looking at pre-employment expenses is to look 
at the statutory exception of “other facilities.”167  The FLSA says 
162. Mayhue’s, 464 F.2d at 1199. 
163. See Castellanos-Contreras, 622 F.3d at 396-97; 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006). 
164. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.35. 
165. 29 C.F.R. § 531.35. 
166. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 
167. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(m); Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 576 
F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d en banc, 622 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2010) (discussing the 
workers’ argument that “in an inverse way” the expenses can be “liken[ed]” to “other 
facilities”). 
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that all employees must receive remuneration in cash, or the cash 
value of some other remuneration such as “board, lodging, or ‘other 
facilities.’”168  This means an employer can meet his obligation by 
providing the employee with, for example, free lodging provided 
the cash value of that lodging, in addition to other remuneration, is 
equal to or greater than the minimum wage requirement.169  In­
versely, a worker who purchases from his own pocket an item be­
longing to the employer has furnished the employer with the cash 
value of that item to the detriment of his wages.170  In its analysis, 
the Eleventh Circuit noted that “the cost of furnishing ‘facilities’ 
which are primarily for the benefit or convenience of the employer 
will not be recognized as reasonable and may not . . . be included in 
computing wages.”171 
Here, with regards to pre-employment point-of-hire fees, the 
employer is not providing the employee with something of benefit; 
the employee is not even getting something that benefits the em­
ployer.  Rather, here the employee is furnishing something of pri­
mary benefit to the employer at the detriment of the employee’s 
own wages, with, according to the Fifth Circuit, no requirement that 
they be reimbursed.172  A result such as this is in opposition to the 
intended purpose of the FLSA.173 
Whether characterizing these expenses as a “kick-back” or ar­
guing that they are analogous to “other facilities,” the result is the 
same.  The employee is paying an expense that is primarily for the 
employer’s benefit; if that out-of-pocket expense drives his wages 
below the federal minimum wage requirement it violates the 
FLSA.174 
168. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 
169. Id. 
170. Id.; contra Castellanos-Contreras, 622 F.3d at 400-01 (rejecting this same ar­
gument brought by the workers). 
171. See Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(emphasis added) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 531.32 (2010)). 
172. Castellanos-Contreras, 622 F.3d at 400-01. 
173. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (finding that “labor conditions detrimental to the main­
tenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general 
well-being of workers” negatively affects commerce). 
174. See Mayhue’s Super Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Hodgson, 464 F.2d 1196, 1199 (5th 
Cir. 1972). 
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3.	 These Expenses can be Characterized as Costs Arising 
From the Employment Itself 
The Arriaga court articulated, in its analysis, the key to identi­
fying wages: “When evaluating expenses that are directly or indi­
rectly related to employment,” a distinction is made between “those 
costs arising from the employment itself and [costs associated with] 
the course of ordinary life.”175  Since violations of the FLSA are 
calculated and reviewed on a work week-to-work week basis, any­
thing that operates to drive an employee’s weekly wages below the 
minimum wage requirement violates the FLSA.176  This has the ef­
fect of protecting workers from improper deductions made during 
the course of every individual work week by affording them an im­
mediate remedy.  It also serves to further the overarching purpose 
of the FLSA, which is to protect a class of workers susceptible to 
abuse.177 
While the “other facilities” language applies to items provided 
by the employer to the employee, it may be helpful in determining 
what types of expenses are considered as arising out of the employ­
ment or, in other words, primarily benefiting the employer.  In 
Schultz v. Hinojosa, several employees sued for back wages and 
overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.178  There, the 
workers, who were slaughterers by trade, were furnished with nec­
essary tools such as butcher’s knives and honing steel, along with 
appropriate clothing.179  Hinojosa, the employer, deducted the costs 
of furnishing these items from the employees’ wages, arguing that 
they were “other facilities” within the meaning of § 203(m) of the 
FLSA.180  According to the FLSA, items furnished that are found 
to be “primarily for the convenience or benefit of the employer” 
are not “other facilities” within the meaning of § 203(m) and may 
not be deducted.181  Finding the deductions improper, the Fifth Cir­
cuit “conclude[d] that as used in the statute, the words ‘other facili­
ties’ [were] to be considered as being in pari materia182 with the 
175. Ariagga, 305 F.3d at 1242. 
176. Id. at 1237; see 29 C.F.R. § 776.4(a) (“The workweek is to be taken as the 
standard in determining the applicability of the Act.”). 
177. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945). 
178. Shultz v. Hinojosa, 432 F.2d 259, 260-61, 267 (5th Cir. 1970). 
179. Id. at 266. 
180. Id. at 267. 
181. See id.; 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (2006). 
182. In pari materia means “[o]n the same subject; relating to the same matter.  It 
is a canon of construction that statutes that are in pari materia may be construed to­
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preceding words ‘board and lodging.’”183  Under that analysis, any 
costs associated with importing foreign workers should be charac­
terized as primarily benefiting the employer.184  As such, these 
costs, which bear no resemblance to “board or lodging,” if paid by 
the worker, act as de facto wage deductions and are impermissible 
under the FLSA.185 
The FLSA does not expressly define what constitutes “other 
facilities,” but the “DOL has promulgated regulations dedicated to 
[the] term . . . identify[ing] circumstances when an employer may 
claim a wage credit or deduction.”186  For purposes of the FLSA 
wages are defined as “includ[ing] the reasonable cost . . . to the 
employer of furnishing [an] employee with board, lodging, or other 
facilities, if [the] board, lodging or other facilities are customarily 
furnished by [an] employer to his employees.”187 
The list of items that are considered wages includes items such 
as housing, food, clothing, meals, and other household effects.188 
While this list is not exhaustive, it does appear to have a common 
thread.  Applying the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis for evaluating ex­
penses, these expenses all appear more closely associated with ex­
penses arising out of the course of ordinary life, as opposed to 
expenses that are borne from the employment itself.189  The Elev­
enth Circuit, citing the Code of Federal Regulations, stated that if 
gether, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another 
statute on the same subject.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 862 (9th ed. 2009). 
183. Shultz, 432 F.2d at 267. 
184. See id.;  29 C.F.R. § 531.35 (2010). 
185. Schultz, 432 F.2d at 267. 
186. Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 F. 3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002); see 
also 29 C.F.R. § 531.32.  Section 531.32 defines “other facilities” to “be something like 
board or lodging” including: 
[m]eals furnished at company restaurants or cafeterias or by hospitals, hotels, 
or restaurants to their employees; meals, dormitory rooms, and tuition fur­
nished by a college to its student employees; housing furnished for dwelling 
purposes; general merchandise furnished at company stores and commissaries 
. . . ; fuel . . . , electricity, water, and gas furnished for the noncommercial 
personal use of the employee; transportation furnished employees between 
their homes and work where the travel time does not constitute hours worked 
compensable under the Act and the transportation is not an incident of and 
necessary to the employment. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
187. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (2006). 
188. 29 C.F.R. § 531.32(a). 
189. See Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1236-37. 
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an expense can be characterized as “an incident of and necessary to 
the employment” it could not be considered as “other facilities.”190 
Because they are an incident of and necessary to employment, 
inbound transportation expenses are different from commuting to 
and from work.  The distinction, drawn by the Ariagga court, is 
that, for purposes of section 531.32 of Title 29 of the Code of Fed­
eral Regulations, commuting expenses are closer in relationship to 
“board and lodging” than other transportation expenses, which are 
an incident of and necessary to the employment.191  No one benefits 
from the guest worker program if the employee remains on foreign 
soil.  Because of this, transportation expenses are more analogous 
to tools, the cost of which ordinarily belongs to the employer, and 
not something like housing, which does not, normally, have a read­
ily discernable connection with work.  Similarly, it is necessary, for 
employment purposes, to obtain a visa in order to legally enter and 
work in the United States.192  This requirement, a condition that, if 
not met, would result in the worker being denied entry into the 
United States, also seems more closely associated with the employ­
ment.  The principle reason the worker is obtaining the visa is for 
employment and the worker is of no value to the employer if he 
cannot legally get to the jobsite to perform his duties. Travel and 
visa expenses, necessary for an employee to begin and continue 
work, are not the type of expenses that arise in the course of ordi­
nary life; they are business expenses that are for the convenience 
and benefit of the employer.  And recruitment expenses can easily 
be identified as primarily arising out of the employment itself, the 
very purpose of recruiting is to link prospective employers with 
available workers. 
Framing it another way, a worker’s inbound transportation, 
visa, and recruitment fees do not look like the types of expenses 
that, if furnished by the employer, could be deducted from the em­
ployee’s wages under the FLSA.193  That is because these expenses 
are an incident of and necessary to the employment itself.194  Here, 
190. Id. at 1237 (quoting 29 C.F.R. §§ 531.32(a),(c)).  Citing two separate DOL 
regulations the Eleventh Circuit stated that “[t]ransportation costs are twice mentioned, 
and in each situation the regulation states that where such transportation is ‘an incident 
of and necessary to the employment’ it does not constitute ‘other facilities.’” Id. (citing 
29 C.F.R. §§ 531.3 & 531.32). 
191. Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1242; 29 C.F.R. § 531.32(a). 
192. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201 & 1202 (2006). 
193. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 531.32. 
194. This language is seen in the context of transportation to the jobsite.  If an 
employer provides the employee with transportation to the jobsite, the cost of that 
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again, the employee has essentially furnished the employer with 
costs that are associated with the employment. These costs consti­
tute an improper wage deduction and the FLSA says they must be 
reimbursed.195 
D.	 Federal Law Requires the Reimbursement of Inbound 
Transportation, Visa, and Recruitment Expenses Because 
They Act as De Facto Wages 
Point-of-hire fees such as a worker’s inbound transportation, 
visa, and recruitment expenses operate as de facto wage deductions 
because they are costs more closely associated with the employ­
ment itself.  Logically, if the worker does not accept employment, 
they will not incur these costs. 
The primary purpose of securing inbound transportation and 
obtaining a visa is for the employment itself. These are not ex­
penses that the worker would likely incur in the ordinary course of 
life, and as such, under an Arriaga analysis these costs more appro­
priately belong to the employer.  Further, a worker’s visa is at­
tached to his employer.196  If the employment is terminated, the 
visa is cancelled and the worker repatriated.197  Applying the ordi­
nary living expense test, the Eleventh Circuit held that it is the “em­
ployer[’s] deci[sion] to utilize the . . . program” that gives rise to 
these costs “and . . . is therefore incumbent upon the employer to 
pay them.”198 
The same is true for recruitment fees; after all it is the em­
ployer who initiates the process by employing the recruiter to find 
labor.  Because the employer needs labor, workers are charged ex­
orbitant fees by recruiters.  The point being that if there was no 
employment need, then, for purposes of the guest worker program, 
there would be no recruitment fees.  And, even if assumed, for sake 
of argument, that the fees could reasonably be charged to either the 
transportation may not be deducted from an employee’s wages even though the em­
ployee receives a benefit.  By virtue of the fact that transportation is incident of and 
necessary to the work itself, the primary beneficiary is the employer. See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 531.32. 
195.	 29 C.F.R. § 531.32. 
196. 8 U.S.C. § 1184.  There are, obviously, other ways for immigrants and non-
immigrants to obtain visas for entrance into the United States; for purposes of this 
paper the focus is on temporary non-immigrant workers whose access is directly con­
nected to their employment. See id. 
197.	 Id. 
198.	 Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 F. 3d 1228, 1244 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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employee or the employer, the principle purpose of the FLSA is to 
protect workers from exploitation.199 
Recruitment fees also differ fundamentally from “other facili­
ties” in that these are fees that seem to arise from the employment 
itself.  Housing, for instance, can be said to be an “other facility” 
because it is something a worker would seek out regardless of em­
ployment; its primary benefit is to the employee.  On the contrary, 
no worker, in the course of ordinary life, seeks to put up the deed to 
their house in order to pay a recruiter an exorbitant fee unless it 
means that they will get the job.  Again, using the Fifth Circuit’s 
analysis, if “other facilities” are read in pari materia with board and 
lodging then recruitment fees “differ[ ] in all fundamental charac­
teristics from” such.200 
While one could argue that seeking employment is in line with 
activities arising out of the course of ordinary life, that analysis fails 
here for the following reason: the employer, by virtue of accessing 
the program, is admitting a need for workers, workers that cannot 
be obtained without the assistance of recruiters.  It is debatable 
whether the employee benefits from this employment experi­
ence.201  Although recent reports such as those released by the 
Southern Poverty Law Center would indicate employees do not 
benefit, there is no doubt that the employer benefits. For the 
worker, the fee is an incident of and necessary to the employment 
and as such should be reimbursable under the FLSA. 
E.	 Castellanos-Contreras: An Argument that Inbound 
Transportation and Visa Expenses Are the Responsibility 
of the Employee and Why that Does Not Work 
It is of little surprise that the argument brought by the guest 
workers in Castellanos-Contreras was “that they [were] entitled to 
reimbursement because, under 29 U.S.C. § 203(m), the expenses 
they incurred [were] de facto deductions from cash wages received 
for their first week of work, [in effect] leaving [them] a [cash] bal­
199.	 29 U.S.C. § 201. 
200. Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1243-44; Castellanos-Contreas v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 
576 F.3d 274, 283 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d en banc, 622 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2010). 
201. BAUER, supra note 3, at 19; Castellanos-Contreras, 622 F.3d at 400; Recinos-
Recinos v. Express Forestry, Inc., No. 05-1355, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2510, at *44-45 
(E.D. La. Jan. 24, 2006); see also De Luna-Guerrero v. N.C. Grower’s Ass’n, Inc., 338 F. 
Supp. 2d 649, 657, 661 (E.D.N.C. 2004). See generally Rivera v. Brickman Group, 
LTD., No. 05-1518, 2008 WL 81570, at *7-9 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 7, 2008). 
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ance owed them by [their employer].”202  This is the same argument 
brought by the workers in Arriaga.203  Despite the fact that this ar­
gument was successful in Arriaga, and was a winner for H-2B work­
ers throughout the lower courts,204 the Fifth Circuit, citing its 
previous holding in Donovan v. Miller Properties, Inc. rejected this 
argument.205 
In contrast, and in the context of H-2B workers, the Castella­
nos-Contreras court, addressing the question of inbound transporta­
tion expenses, found guidance in the INA and H-2A regulations.206 
“Under the [INA], an H-2B guest worker’s outbound transporta­
tion expenses sometimes belong to the employer [and] [u]nder [H­
2A regulations], an H-2A guest worker’s inbound transportation 
expenses sometimes belong to the employer.”207  This, the court 
reasoned, coupled with the fact that “[n]o provision . . . requires an 
employer to [pay] an H-2B guest worker’s inbound transportation 
expenses . . . [is] indicative” of Congress’s desire to assign these 
inbound transportation costs to the H-2B worker.208  Since Con­
gress took the time to expressly address an H-2B worker’s out­
bound transportation expenses and the United States Customs and 
Immigration Services in their regulations expressly address an H­
2A worker’s inbound transportation expenses, Congress’ silence on 
the question of an H-2B worker’s inbound transportation indicates 
a preference that these costs remain the responsibility of the 
worker.209  The court employed similar logic when it came to visa 
202. Castellanos-Contreras, 576 F.3d at 279. The workers argued, unsuccessfully, 
that these pre-employment expenses (inbound travel, visa, and recruitment) are akin to 
“employer-furnished ‘facilities,’ such as room and board,” which are permissibly de­
ducted from an employee’s wages because they confer a benefit to the employee.  In­
versely, the employees argued, these costs inferred a benefit on the employer and 
should thus be reimbursed. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 
203. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. R 
204. Recinos-Recinos, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2510, at *44-45; see also De Luna-
Guerrero, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 661-63. See generally Rivera, 2008 WL 81570. 
205. See Castellanos-Contreras, 576 F.3d at 280; Donovan v. Miller Props., Inc., 
711 F.2d 49, 50 (5th Cir. 1983) (deciding the question of whether “other facilities” pro­
vided by the employer need to be the “employee’s choice” in order for the employer to 
properly deduct the costs from wages). The court in Donovan held that “employee 
choice” had no bearing on whether or not the employer could deduct the costs under 29 
U.S.C. § 203(m). Donovan, 711 F. 2d at 50; see 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 
206. Castellanos-Contreras, 576 F.3d at 282. 
207. Id. 
208. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(5)(A) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(5)(i) (2010). 
209. Castellanos-Contreras, 576 F.3d at 280-83.  The Department of Labor has 
codified this reimbursement rule in the Code of Federal Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. 
§ 655.102(b)(5)(i). 
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expenses, holding that they, like inbound transportation, are costs 
that more appropriately belong to the employee and are not the 
responsibility of the employer.210  In reaching this conclusion, the 
court placed great emphasis on the fact that employers are respon­
sible for fees associated with the application to sponsor H-2B work­
ers,211 while citing the Code of Federal Regulations212 in concluding 
that the visa expenses themselves are more properly borne by the 
employee.213 
When juxtaposing the Arriaga and Castellanos-Contreras deci­
sions, the following result is reached: a worker, employed for agri­
cultural employment, must be reimbursed for their inbound 
transportation and visa expenses within their first week of work, 
regardless of whether or not they ever complete any more of their 
contractual obligation.  Conversely, a worker employed to work in 
a non-agricultural job, will never be entitled to recoup these costs, 
even if they complete their contractual obligation in its entirety.  A 
result like this is not only unfair to the H-2B worker, but it is also 
unfair to the agricultural employer, who will have to pay transpor­
tation and visa expenses for each and every one of their employees, 
while their non-agricultural counterparts will never bear these 
costs.  If the rationale for greater regulation of the agricultural pro­
gram214 is the fact that historically these workers have been subject 
to abuse, then, given recent reports of abuse of non-agricultural 
workers,215 H-2B workers should now be recognized as needing the 
same types of legal protections.  In order to ensure this, the analysis 
applied to transportation costs by the Eleventh Circuit in Arriaga 
should extend not only to H-2A workers, but to H-2B workers as 
well.  In fact, prior to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Castellanos-
Contreras, a court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that 
“[t]he rationale employed by the Arriaga court is applicable to the 
H-2B program.  Plaintiffs in this case correctly noted that Arriaga is 
210. Castellanos-Contreras, 576 F.3d at 280. 
211. Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(A) (2010) (mandating that in order to be­
come a qualified H-2B visa sponsor, certain forms and filing fees must be submitted). 
212. 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(l)(1) (2010).  This section of the Code requires “a nonimmi­
grant visa applicant [to] submit for formal adjudication by a consular officer . . . with 
any required supporting documents [as well as] the requisite processing fee or evidence 
of the prior payment of the processing fee when such documents are received and ac­
cepted for adjudication by the consular officer.” Id. 
213. Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 622 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 
2010) (en banc); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(A); 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(l)(1). 
214. See generally Martinez v. Reich, 934 F. Supp. 232, 237-38 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
215. See generally BAUER, supra note 3, at 13. R 
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a FLSA case which does not hinge on any differences between the 
H-2A and the H-2B guest-worker programs.”216 
F. An Additional Requirement for Recruitment Fees 
In order for recruitment fees to be reimbursed, workers may 
need to meet an additional requirement. The court in Arriaga held 
that recruitment fees might be reimbursable under the FLSA if the 
workers could establish that there was apparent authority created 
in the recruitment agency.217  On February 12, 2010, the DOL pub­
lished a new final rule, which requires employers to contractually 
forbid recruiters and their agents from accepting fees as a condition 
of employment.218  The question with recruitment fees would seem 
to turn less on whether the fees can be classified as wage deduc­
tions, and more on whether apparent authority can be established 
to hold the employer liable.219 
The Restatement (Third) of Agency defines “apparent author­
ity” as: “the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a princi­
pal’s legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably 
believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and 
that belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.”220  Em­
ployers rely on foreign recruiters to supply their labor force.  Pro­
spective employees trust these recruiters to link them with good 
jobs.  The principal’s manifestation, in this instance is to find and 
hire workers, and the worker has reason to believe that the re­
cruiter has authority to act on behalf of the principal. The DOL has 
expressed an intention to protect workers from being forced to pay 
exorbitant recruiting fees.221  They have done this by requiring, in 
their final rule, employers to contractually forbid any recruiter or 
their agent from accepting a fee as a condition of employment.222 
216. Recinos-Recinos v. Express Forestry, Inc., No. 05-1355, 2006 U.S. Dist 
LEXIS 2510, at *44-45 (E.D. La. Jan. 24, 2006); see also De Luna-Guerrero v. N.C. 
Grower’s Ass’n, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 649, 656-57 (E.D.N.C. 2004). See generally Rivera 
v. Brickman Group, LTD., No. 05-1518, 2008 WL 81570 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 7, 2008). 
217. Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d 1228, 1244-46 (11th Cir. 2002). 
218. Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States, 
75 Fed. Reg. 6884, 6925 (Feb. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655.135). 
219. Id. at 6926. 
220. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006). 
221. Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States, 
75 Fed. Reg. at 6925. 
222. Id. at 6925-26.  The new rule, published February 12, 2010, requires employ­
ers to contractually forbid all recruiters and their agents from accepting a fee as a con­
dition of employment. Id. at 6883, 6925-26.  The new rule goes on to state that this 
requirement must be bona fide and “evidence showing that the employer paid the re­
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That should not mean that employers are exempted from responsi­
bility simply because he or she followed guidelines and contractu­
ally forbade their recruiters from receiving this fee. The Tenth 
Circuit has “held that a principal may be liable for acts of an agent 
that are expressly contrary to instructions if the third party has a 
reasonable belief that the agent is authorized.”223  Purely from a 
policy standpoint this requirement, that purports to be a protection 
for the workers, cannot in practical effect provide a shield from lia­
bility for employers. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE GUEST WORKER PROGRAM 
A.	 Congress and the DOL’s Lack of Clarity Needs to be 
Addressed 
Given the recent lack of clarity by the DOL, one should not 
assume that their opinions are controlling.  In fact, administrative 
agencies opinions, findings, and rulings can be relied on for their 
persuasive value, but nothing more.224  Analyzing the arguments 
brought forth in Arriaga, the Eleventh Circuit found that Opinion 
Letters225 written by the DOL, under a Skidmore analysis, carried 
some weight, but the amount of “weight . . . in a particular case . . . 
depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro­
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, 
if lacking power to control.”226 
cruiter no fee, or an extraordinarily low fee, or continued to use a recruiter about whom 
[they] had received numerous credible complaints” may be used to show that the con­
tractual requirement was not in fact bona fide. See id. at 6925-26. 
223. Andrea L. Schmitt, Comment, Ending the Silence: Thai H-2A Workers, Re­
cruitment Fees, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 167, 183 
(2007) (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Buster, 241 F.2d 178, 183 (10th Cir. 1957)). 
Phillips held that even though an agent failed to follow company policy, the fact that 
the company held him out as their agent, “with apparent authority to act for it [with] 
respect to ordinary local matters,” was sufficient to hold the principal company liable. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 241 F.2d at 183. 
224. Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d 1228, 1238 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing 
Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
225. These opinion letters expressed the DOL’s position, at the time of Arriaga, 
that any deduction cutting into the minimum wage for the transportation of workers 
from their place of origin to their place of employment are primarily for the benefit of 
the employer and as such violate the FLSA. See Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Ho­
tels, LLC, 576 F.3d 274, 280-81 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OP. LTR. 
OF THE WAGE-HOUR ADM’R No. 1139, 1990 DOLWH LEXIS 1, at *3 (June 27, 1990)), 
aff’d en banc, 622 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2010). 
226.	 Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1238 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). 
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In Skidmore v. Swift, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
“what, if any, deference courts should [give] to [an] Administrator’s 
conclusions.”227  “[T]he rulings, interpretations and opinions of the 
Administrator . . . while not controlling upon the courts by reason 
of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed 
judgment to which [the] courts . . . may properly resort for gui­
dance.”228 Skidmore involved firefighters who were required by 
their employers to sleep on the premises.229  The firefighters argued 
that because they were required to sleep on the premises, those 
hours should be counted as work hours for purposes of the 
FLSA.230  Despite drawing a distinction between the role of the 
courts and that of an administrative agency, the Supreme Court ar­
ticulated in Skidmore that “while not controlling upon the courts by 
reason of their authority,” under the FLSA, the “opinions of the 
Administrator . . . do constitute a body of . . . informed judgment to 
which courts . . . may properly resort for guidance.”231 
Because they promulgated the rules, the DOL’s interpretation 
“constitutes a body” that should be consulted for guidance.  Re­
cently, the DOL reversed their position on point of hire transporta­
tion fees stating that “[t]he cost[ ] of relocation to the site of the job 
opportunity generally is not an ‘incident’ of an H-2B worker’s em­
ployment within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. 531.32, and is not prima­
rily for the benefit of the H-2B employer.”232  Then, in March of 
2009, the DOL stated that “[the] issue warrants further review . . . 
and the [December 2008] interpretation may not be relied on as a 
statement of agency policy. . . .”233  In their Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking Changes, published in the Federal Register in Septem­
ber of 2009, the DOL ducked the issue by first by mentioning it in 
227. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139 (involving the question of whether or not tests 
developed by DOL for purposes of determining if an employee’s time spent sleeping on 
the premises, as required by his employer, could be characterized as work time, should 
be treated with deference by the courts). 
228. Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1238 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). 
229. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 140. 
232. Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 576 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 
2009) (second alteration in original), aff’d en banc, 622 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2010); 
Labor Certification Process and Enforcement for Temporary Employment in Occupa­
tions Other Than Agriculture or Registered Nursing in the United States (H-2B Work­
ers), and Other Technical Changes, 73 Fed. Reg. 78020, 78040 (Dec. 19, 2008). 
233. Withdrawal of Interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act Concerning 
Relocation Expenses Incurred by H-2A and H-2B Workers, 74 Fed. Reg. 13261, 13262 
(Mar. 26, 2009). 
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an H-2A context only, and second, stating simply that the FLSA 
operates independently of the H-2A program.234 
Essentially, because Congress has been silent on the issue of 
point of hire fees, the courts and the DOL have been left to offer 
varying interpretations.  The result is fundamentally unfair in that it 
expects the worker to shoulder all of the costs associated with com­
ing to the United States to help alleviate our labor shortages. The 
INA was established for two principle purposes: first, to ensure a 
sufficient labor force of ready, able, willing, and qualified workers; 
and second, to prevent the potential of United States workers suf­
fering adverse effects due to the presence of undocumented work­
ers.235  Since the welfare and well being of the foreign workers is 
not an explicit purpose of the Act it is fair to say that these workers, 
who are economically necessary, are, to put it mildly, at a 
disadvantage. 
The hotel workers in Castellanos-Contreras each incurred be­
tween $3,000 and $5,000 worth of debt prior to even starting 
work.236  Their wages ranged between $6.02 per hour to $7.79 per 
hour, and they were not reimbursed for any of their point of hire 
expenses.237  In most cases, low and unskilled workers, who are 
willing to leave their families and countries of origin in order to find 
life-subsistent jobs, are not the kind of workers who can readily af­
ford to pay $5,000 out of pocket.  Because they cannot afford these 
costs, they often have to take out a loan, at an exorbitant interest 
rate, in order to obtain a visa, secure transportation to the job site, 
and pay their recruiter.238 
B. Even if the Fees are Reimbursed, Problems Persist 
A problem inherent in this analysis is that by characterizing 
these payments as de facto wage deductions, the worker may still be 
234. Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States, 
74 Fed. Reg. 171, 45,906, 45,915 (proposed Sept. 4, 2009). The DOL noted: 
language has been added to place employers on notice that they may be sub­
ject to the FLSA that operates independently of the H-2A program and im­
poses requirements relating to deductions from wages.  In providing notice to 
employers of companion FLSA requirements, the Department hopes to assure 
better protection of U.S. and foreign workers. 
Id. 
235. See 8 U.S.C. § 1188(1)(A)-(B) (2006). 
236. Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, 576 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 
2009), aff’d en banc, 622 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2010); see BAUER, supra note 3, at 10. R 
237. Castellanos-Contreras, 576 F.3d at 278. 
238. See Ashby, supra note 5, at 904-05. R 
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subjected to loss of wages owed due to out-of-pocket expenses that 
primarily benefit the employer.  This will happen where, as in most 
cases, a worker is contractually scheduled to earn more per hour 
than the minimum wage.  In these cases, under an FLSA analysis, 
the worker can only recover unpaid wages up to the amount set out 
in the statute.  Presumably, then, the worker would lose whatever 
he was contractually scheduled to earn above the minimum 
wage.239 
A larger problem is that there is no good way of ensuring that 
employers will ever reimburse these costs.  If an employer decides 
not to reimburse the costs, the worker’s only recourse would be to 
seek relief in the courts.  Of course, since the worker is bound to 
their United States employer,240 this puts them in the precarious 
position of having to decide whether to move forward with a law­
suit and risk having their visa cancelled, or to continue to labor 
under massive debt. 
One way to deal with this would be to require an upfront reim­
bursement.241  Proponents of this position assert that “[a]lthough 
Arriaga-type reimbursement is the law in a number of circuits, it is 
frequently ignored, and some immigrant rights advocates note that 
temporary guest workers are rarely, if ever, paid properly even 
under [the] clearly codified law such as the minimum wage.”242  The 
issue is compounded for H-2B workers who are not even entitled to 
free legal services,243 making it less likely that they will bring an 
Arriaga-type action.244  One author goes on to propose the devel­
opment of a reimbursement structure where upfront payments for 
transportation, visa, and recruitment expenses would be required 
prior to attaining a labor certification from the DOL.245  These 
funds could be estimated, and the fees paid by the employer held in 
a government escrow account “through which certified checks 
would be issued to workers upon [their] arrival at the worksite.”246 
239. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.10-6.55.11 (2010) (requiring employers to obtain a pre­
vailing wage rate prior to seeking labor certification). 
240. 8 U.S.C. § 1184. 
241. Ashby, supra note 5, at 916-27 (arguing that requiring upfront reimburse- R 
ment would prevent workers from falling into indentured servitude). 
242. Id. at 916. 
243. Temporary Forestry Workers Now Eligible for LSC-Funded Legal Services, 
GEORGIAADVOCATES.ORG (Jan. 11, 2008), http://www.georgiaadvocates.org/news/arti­
cle.176193-Temporary_Forestry_Workers_Now_Eligible_for_LSCFunded_Legal_ 
Services. 
244. Ashby, supra note 5, at 904 n.61. R 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
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While this would certainly be an improvement over what is cur­
rently in place, it still requires the workers to make the initial pay­
ments.  In most instances these workers will have to borrow the 
money, often at very high interest rates.  A better solution would be 
to require the employer to directly pay all travel and visa costs, and, 
as has been suggested by some commentators, a fee for recruitment 
services.247  This would lock an employer into a recruiter, creating a 
vested interest on the part of the employer in ensuring that the re­
cruiter does not improperly charge fees.  It would also ensure that 
the recruiter has been paid for his services, making it less likely that 
they will break their contractual obligations by seeking payment 
from the actual workers.  At the very least it is a way of making 
employers, who too often throw their hands up and claim lack of 
knowledge, accountable for the activities of the agencies they 
employ. 
In addition, workers should be informed, in their native lan­
guage, through whatever agency oversees the exportation of labor, 
that upfront, point-of-hire expenses are not their responsibility. 
The United States and sending countries need to create memoranda 
of understanding that create a governmental partnership aimed at 
mutually benefiting each other by ensuring that qualified workers 
receive fair protection and equal benefit of the law. 
Travel and visa expenses, paid directly by the employer, could 
be secured by the government and transferred from one prospec­
tive employee to another in the event an employee does not work 
out.  By putting the onus on the employer to pay these fees, they 
have a greater investment in these workers.  Further, employers 
may be more likely to increase wages for domestic workers, making 
jobs more attractive to the United States labor force, since hiring 
foreign workers will cost them more money. Finally, and most im­
portantly, this will help ensure that a class of people, ripe for abuse, 
are not plunged into forced labor situations where the debt they 
have accrued simply by seeking employment forces them to labor 
into subhuman conditions. 
C. Recent Attempts by Congress to Address the Issue 
In recent years, members of Congress have proposed legisla­
tion that, had it passed, may have positively impacted the guest 
247. Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States, 
75 Fed. Reg. 6884, 6925 (Feb. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655.135); Ashby, 
supra note 5, at 916-27. R 
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worker program.  For example, George Miller, the Chairman of the 
House Committee on Education and Labor, introduced the Inden­
tured Servitude Abolition Act in 2007,248 a bill that would have re­
quired that the terms of employment be clearly and accurately 
disclosed to workers,249 in their native languages.250  Additionally, 
Chairman Miller’s bill sought to outlaw what he termed “exorbi­
tant” fees paid by workers to recruiters, force foreign labor 
recruiters to register with the DOL, grant the DOL the ability to 
exclude unscrupulous recruiters from participating in guest worker 
programs, and hold both recruiters and employers liable for violat­
ing any of the Act’s provisions.251 
Also in 2007, Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders introduced a 
bill with the stated purpose of “increas[ing] the wages and benefits 
of blue collar workers by strengthening labor provisions in the H­
2B program, to provide for labor recruiter accountability, and for 
other purposes.”252  The Increasing American Wages and Benefits 
Act253 (the Act) would have applied many of the protections specif­
ically designated for H-2A workers to H-2B workers as well.254 
Some of the proposed provisions included affording H-2B workers 
with transportation reimbursement,255 while also seeking to in­
crease prevailing wage rates and authorizing the Legal Services 
Corporation to represent H-2B workers.256  The Act also marked 
an attempt to regulate international recruitment of guest workers 
248. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, Chairman Miller Introduces Bill to End Inden­
tured Servitude in the U.S. and its Territories, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Mar. 
20, 2007, 5:52 PM), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/speech/edlabor_dem/rel033007.html 
[hereinafter Comm. on Educ. and Labor]. 
249. Id. 
250. Indentured Servitude Abolition Act of 2007, H.R. 1763, 110th Cong. 
§ 2(a)(3) (1998) (seeking to require that workers be provided with information in their 
“native language,” where “necessary and reasonable”). This bill “was introduced by 
California Representative George Miller in 2007 but never passed.”  Eleanor G. Carr, 
Search for a Round Peg: Seeking a Remedy for Recruitment Abuses in the U.S. Guest 
Worker Program, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 399, 439 n.239 (2010). For more infor­
mation see Indentured Servitude Abolition Act of 2007, OPENCONGRESS, http://www. 
opencongress.org/bill/110-h1763/show (last visited Apr. 21, 2011). 
251. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, supra note 248. R 
252. Increasing American Wages and Benefits Act of 2007, S. 2094, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
253. Id. 
254. H-2B Legislation in the 110th Congress: Senator Sanders Introduces Legisla­
tion to Protect U.S. and H-2B Workers, FARMWORKER JUSTICE, http://www.farmworker 
justice.org/guestworker-programs/h-2b/153—h-2b-legislation-in-the0110th-congress 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2011). 
255. S. 2094 § 105(J). 
256. Id. § 101(F). 
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by recruitment firms employed by United States businesses seeking 
employees.257  The bill never made it out of committee.258 
CONCLUSION 
Simply put, the United States economy has, and will continue 
to depend on the labor of foreign citizens. These men and women 
are, in many ways, the backbone of this great nation. They keep 
the economy moving by taking jobs that cannot be filled by Ameri­
can workers.  In doing this, they are promised a better life, an op­
portunity to better their circumstances, an opportunity that they 
will not find in their home country. Yet, too many of them become 
victims, easy prey for unscrupulous recruiters who are only too will­
ing to rob them of everything.  Because they are poor, they are oft­
entimes forced to borrow in order to cover all of the fees necessary 
for them to attain employment.  This debt forces them into a life of 
involuntary servitude.  The system encourages this by forcing em­
ployees to bear the burden of these costs.  It also encourages this by 
permitting employers to contract with recruiters with little, if any, 
government regulation.  The employer is able to shield himself by, 
in effect, playing a game of “don’t ask and don’t tell”; so long as he 
is unaware of what is going on he escapes liability. 
The FLSA requires an employee to receive his wages free and 
clear of deductions.  If an employee has to shoulder the costs of 
their inbound transportation and visa attainment, along with paying 
a recruiting fee, these wages cannot be said to be free and clear 
because these costs operate as de facto wage deductions.259  The 
FLSA makes clear that any deductions that work to drive an em­
ployee’s wages below the minimum-wage requirement must be re­
imbursed within the week in which they occur.260  The best way to 
determine whether these costs are de facto wage deductions is to 
determine whether they are the type of cost that would arise in the 
course of ordinary life, or whether they are an incident of and nec­
essary to employment.  Because these expenses are primarily for 
the benefit and convenience of the employer, they are more prop­
erly characterized as being an incident of and necessary to employ­
257. Id. 
258. Carr, supra note 250; Increasing American Wages and Benefits Act of 2007, R 
S. 2094, 110th Cong. 
259. 29 C.F.R. § 531.35 (2010); see also Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, 
LLC, 576 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d en banc, 622 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2010); Arriaga v. 
Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002). 
260. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 531.35. 
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ment.  They are, for purposes of the FLSA, legally the 
responsibility of the employer, and as such, must be reimbursed to 
the employee within his first week of employment. 
Unfortunately, it is not that simple. The United States guest 
worker program consists of two separate and unequal classifica­
tions.  One group, the courts have held, is entitled to reimburse­
ment for inbound transportation and visa expenses and that 
reimbursement is to take place in their first week of employment. 
This group may also be entitled to recover recruitment fees if they 
can establish apparent authority.  The other group is entitled to 
nothing.  America is often referred to as the land of opportunity. 
For these unskilled foreign workers, that reference will remain 
empty until real change is enacted. 
The Arriaga principles should apply to both H-2A and H-2B 
workers alike.  There are no valid reasons why one class of worker 
should be afforded protection and not the other. While that solu­
tion makes sense, it is not, by itself, enough.  Simply reimbursing 
the worker will not prevent them from taking on the debt in the 
first place and from being preyed upon by unscrupulous recruiters. 
A better solution would be to require United States employers to 
directly pay for all inbound travel, visa, and recruitment fees for the 
workers.  Asking those who are already poor to shoulder the bur­
den of moving our economy forward is both impractical and wrong. 
Employment is not a benefit if it creates involuntary servitude.  But 
the ability to have cheap labor is always beneficial and inbound 
transportation, visa, and recruitment expenses are necessary in or­
der for foreign workers to labor in the United States. 
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